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JURISPRUDENCE
[It has occurred to the editor that a section dealing with Law
as jurisprudence might, from time to time, be desirable in the
Law Review. Since the point of view adopted must necessarily be
different from that taken in the usual analysis of a legal problem
from existing statutes and decisions in the civil law, the follow-
ing introductory statements are made in the interest of clarity and
explanation.
In treating of man two essential and co-existing factors must
be taken into consideration-the natural and the supernatural
(physical and spiritual, legal and moral). Abnormal situations
arise where emphasis is given one factor to the overbalancing ex-
clusion of the other. A situation where extreme attention is grant-
ed the supernatural usually is governed by considerations and af-
fected by matter beyond our intended scope. That results in such
a situation may be far removed from those in the antithetical
situation is all that is necessary to mention. Practically important
is discussion of current overemphasis of the natural factor.
These factors affecting man are not independent and unquali-
fied one by the other; rather they are mutual and best described
as complementary. Analogies are not difficult to find. Electric
lighting is obtained from a light bulb and conducted electric cur-
rent. Neither the light bulb nor the current alone can be effective
to cause electric lighting. A moving picture results from a combin-
ation of film and movie projector. One without the other is wholly
incapable of causing such a consequence. Like these material re-
sults of coordinated material forces, there are ends man should
achieve by reason of his being a human being, for instance life on
earth as a rational being. Such desirable ends are unattainable un-
less the essential factors of man are allowed mutual and comple-
mentary interplay in solving human problems. That such interplay
is not occuring is abundantly evidenced by the news items in every
daily paper. The ubiquitous philosophy of materialism which is
today compounding its advance threatens to thwart rational human
achievement on an increasing scale.
The legal order is uniquely situated in the sphere of human
activity. It has to do with things material but it takes its precepts
from the supernatural, that is, the moral order wherein is found
the Natural Moral Law. It is as if it were an intermediate; admin-
istering, qualifying and defining material activities by the dictates
of the non-material. So long as the Law thus functions, it fulfills
its destiny. However, were the Law to ignore the moral order
and instead take its dictates from another material order such as
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economics or sociology, there would be an illfitting relationship
which would prevent desirable attainment of ends. The supernatu-
ral would have been replaced with the natural. The comments
which will appear in the Jurisprudence section of this Law Review
will have as their basic thesis the fact that when Law deviates
from the norm supplied by the Natural Moral Law, no good will
be accomplished. A few instances of Law thus deviating are: di-
vorce, sterilization and the church-state controversy. An instance
of tentative deviation is being dictated by the economic order in
euthanasia. For example of Law completely out of its orb, study
Russian Communism.-EDITOR]
DIVORCE*
No more fitting example exists to illustrate Law in operation con-
trary to univocal moral dictates than divorce a vinculo. The conclusion
arrived at herein is that absolutely NO divorce a vinculo can properly
be granted by human authority. All that is necessary to support this
proposition is a retreat to reason.
With slight reflection it can be appreciated that widespread divorce
tends: (1) to render difficult, if not impossible, the proper education
of children; (2) to destroy the spirit of union and love that should exist
between husband and wife; (3) to encourage unlawful indulgence of
passion and lead to commission of crimes; and (4) to lessen the dignity
of womanhood. Divorce also tends to the ultimate collapse of the state
through its destruction of the family, for as governments are evolved
from society, society owes its being to families.
It is unnecessary to insult the intellect by following these charges
with proof, for there can be no one to offer challenge to these con-
clusions of widespread divorce. The real difficulty appears not in the
condemnation of widespread divorce, but in outlawing divorce in any
case. Proponents of divorce persuasively argue their case from par-
ticular examples, not from any concept of general evil. For instance,
they say, if divorce is allowed for only the most urgent reasons such
*This comment takes only one of the possible approaches to the problem and
deals only lightly with it. Following are suggestions for further reading.
Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, p. 54, "Divorce"; Vol. IX, p. 691, "Mar-
riage."
LE Btrnz, The American Philosophy of Law, Ch. XII, pp. 278-283.
SuLLivAN, Special Ethics, Thesis XXX.
ROBINsoN, Elements of American Jurisprudence, No. 41; Elementary Law,
Nos. 121, 150, 172, 174, 504.
BLAcKSTONE, 1 Comm., Ch. XV, pp. 433-445.
KENT, 2 Carm., Lects. XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII.
CRONIN, Science of Ethics, Vol. 11, Chs. XIII, XIV.
ANDREws, American Law, Vol. 11, Ch. XVIII.
Ricxzy, Moral Philosophy, Pt. 2, Ch. VI.
HOLLAND, Natural Law, Lect. VI, sec. 2.
Ru'Hmrzoan, Institutes, Vol. 1, Ch. XV, pp. 314-359.
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as sterility or adultery, very few divorces will take place and the con-
sequences of divorce will be practically eliminated, or; at least divorce
should be allowed in the case of steriliy if sterility frustrates the pri-
mary end of marriage, or; frequently marriage entails very great
evils for one of the parties; surely in such a case divorce should
be allowed. It is argued that individual cases present such a pa-
thetic plea that it is unjust to withhold divorce. The error of such
a stand is lack of perspective; for once it is granted that divorce should
be allowed for the "hard" cases, there is no way of avoiding the logical
conclusion of widespread divorce. An analogy may here be helpful. "A
child hears his father lie to the rent collector. He uses this as an excuse
for his lying to his father, to his teacher, to his associates. His father
established a pattern; the boy follows that pattern; the boys who are
associated with him copy and copy and copy .... in an endless chain
of evil."' So also is it with divorce. Because of the manner in which
the human race is interlocked, an individual's conduct becomes a pattern
for others. Not many years ago the Law finally took compassion on
the misery of mismated marriages, usurped jurisdiction, and granted a
divorce; but it at the same time announced that this action was only
on the strictest of grounds. In that beginning divorces were granted only
because of adultery. The die was cast. The pattern was perpetuated and
amplified under one of two heads. Either the strict grounds were main-
tained and professional compromisers were used to provide evidence
that the grounds were met (co-existent were laxer grounds for annul-
ment) or the grounds broke down until divorce could be granted when
one of the couple eats apples in bed. The Law says, "You may have
a divorce and you may remarry if your marriage is literally driving
you insane," and soon it is found that a husband's repetition of jokes
fulfills such a condition. Once divorce has succeeded in putting its
wedge into society, there can be no halting its cleavage.
Clearly then, divorce a vinculo, by patronizing the individual, tends
to the ultimate destruction of society. Who then is there that can
uphold such a condition? For those persistent advocates adverse to
this stand who still maintain that it is inhuman to require continued
cohabitation when only evil results from such a union, it is sufficient
to state that divorce a mensa et thoro can be obtained.
Paradoxical as it may appear, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
reflected the attitude of this paper in the following words: "(marriage)
... . which God will not and man cannot dissolve, until death shall
part them.' 2
HowARD H. BoYLE, JR.
'Lord, D. A., S.J., About Divorce, p. 34.
2 Campbell v. Campbell, 37 Wis. 206 at p. 214, 88 A.L.R. 200 (1875).
